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Prescription drug prices and rising healthcare costs in the United States continue to be a topic 
of controversy as drug manufacturers, governments, insurance companies and patients battle over 
who to blame for high drug prices.1  Due to increasingly high healthcare costs, the reality of how 
insurance companies cover the cost of prescription medicines has left many Americans 
“functionally uninsured” meaning that their health insurance either does not cover certain 
medications or requires them to pay out-of-pocket costs that they simply cannot afford.2  Patient 
Assistance Programs (“PAPs”) serve as an important safety net for the many Americans who do 
not have insurance or whose insurance does not sufficiently cover the costs of their medications.3  
PAPs come in various forms and facilitate patient access to prescription drugs by providing 
financially needy patients with cash subsidies and co-pay assistance.4  At first glance, relieving the 
financial burdens that would otherwise keep patients from accessing life-saving medications 
appears to be a reasonable solution.5  However, from a broader perspective, it might not do 
anything to address the underlying reasons why these financial burdens exist in the first place, and 
a flood of recent enforcement actions by the Department of Justice targeting PAPs have led to 
increased scrutiny in the area.6  Many question the long-term sustainability of the current patient 
financial assistance model, and wonder if PAPs are merely a Band-Aid trying to fix a much larger 
problem.7  
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., The University of Delaware. 
1 See List of Pharmaceutical Companies in the United States of America, PHARMAAPROACH, 
https://www.pharmapproach.com/list-of-pharmaceutical-companies-in-united-states-of-america (last updated Dec. 
21, 2020) (listing pharmaceutical companies in the U.S.); 10 Government Health Care and Assistance Programs, 
HOFSTRA UNIV. SCH. OF LAW BLOG, https://onlinelaw.hofstra.edu/blog/10-government-health-care-insurance-and-
assistance-programs (last visited Apr. 20, 2020) (listing U.S. government sponsored health insurance programs); Alex 
Flitton, Top 25 Health Insurance Companies in the U.S., PEOPLEKEEP (Jan. 13, 2020, 4:09 PM), 
https://www.peoplekeep.com/blog/top-25-health-insurance-companies-in-the-u.s (listing examples of private health 
insurance companies in the U.S.). 
2 The Need for Patient Assistance and Access Programs, PATIENTS RISING NOW, https://patientsrisingnow.org/the-
need-for-patient-assistance-and-access-programs/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).  
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Rishi Sachdev & Yousuf Zafar, Patient Assistance Programs: Do They Help or Hurt?, NAT’L COAL. FOR CANCER 
SURVIVORSHIP: CANCER POLICY BLOG (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.canceradvocacy.org/blog/patient-assistance-
programs-do-they-help-or-hurt/.  
6 See id. 
7 Trevis Gleason, Who Really Benefits From Pharma Patient Assistance Programs?, EVERYDAY HEALTH: LIFE WITH 
MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.everydayhealth.com/columns/trevis-gleason-life-with-multiple-
sclerosis/who-benefits-from-patient-assistance-programs/.  
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In order to begin analyzing the potential issues, it is important to take a closer look at the 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole.  The United States biopharmaceutical industry is the largest 
in the world, and U.S. firms conduct over half of the world’s pharmaceutical research and 
development spending.8  The pharmaceutical industry often appears on lists of the most profitable 
industries;” the massive profits often associated with pharmaceutical companies are made possible, 
however, because of the patent protection granted to new drug discoveries.9  The pharmaceutical 
industry is research and development-driven with manufacturers investing millions of dollars and 
incurring significant expenses with hopes of developing a “blockbuster” drug.10  A successful drug 
discovery can generate exponential profits, but the high upfront costs and level of uncertainty 
create a risky investment, leaving investors seeking high potential returns to offset the risk.11  Once 
a drug is developed, marginal manufacturing costs are relatively low, which makes patent 
protection necessary to justify the research and development costs.12  Without patents, 
manufacturers would be able to produce drugs at minimal prices; there would be no incentive, 
however, for pharmaceutical companies to take the risk and invest in the creation of new drugs if 
there was no prospect of high returns.13  This would create a potentially devastating impact on 
future medical progress as research and development investing would be left to public funding.14 
This comment will provide a comprehensive overview of the pharmaceutical industry and 
illustrate the role that PAPs play in the prescription drug pricing crisis.  Part I will look at the 
economic factors that drive the prescription drug market, provide a basic overview of the 
pharmaceutical supply chain as drugs move from manufacturer to patient, and the financial 
relationship between different key players.  Part II will introduce the various types of PAPs and 
explain how they play a role in facilitating patient’s access to prescription drugs.  Part III will 
describe the potential for fraud presented by PAPs, address guidance provided by the Office of the 
Inspector General and summarize recent enforcement actions related to PAPs.  Next, Part IV will 
briefly cover recent government enforcement action related to PAPs.  Part V will utilize data to 
illustrate the problem created by PAPs, how they affect prescription drug spending, and who is 
hurt by the cost-implications of this system.  Part VI will summarize recent state legislation 
regarding limiting PAPs in order to lower prescription drug prices, and why these laws fell short.  
Finally, Part VII will use an example of a recent federal legislative proposal to analyze the 
challenges presented in creating federal healthcare legislation. 
 
I. The Pharmaceutical Industry at a Glance 
 
 The United States pharmaceutical industry is extremely complex and includes many more 
market participants beyond simply manufacturers and consumers.15  The United States 
 
8 Biopharmaceutical Spotlight: The Biopharmaceutical Industry in the United States, SELECTUSA, 
https://www.selectusa.gov/pharmaceutical-and-biotech-industries-united-states (last visited Apr. 29, 2020).  
9 U.S. Pharmaceutical Pricing: An Overview, AXENE HEALTH PARTNERS, https://axenehp.com/us-pharmaceutical-
pricing-overview/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2020) [hereinafter U.S. Pharmaceutical Pricing]. 
10 Id.  (defining a blockbuster drug as “an innovative drug that treats a serious condition with a large number of patients 
in economically advanced countries”).  
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 U.S. Pharmaceutical Pricing, supra note 9. 
15 See generally Follow the Pill: Understanding the U.S. Commercial Pharmaceutical Supply Chain, THE KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (2005), http://avalere.com/research/docs/Follow_the_Pill.pdf [hereinafter Follow the Pill].  
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pharmaceutical supply chain is “multi-faceted” and the process in which drugs travel to patients 
includes a number of “stakeholders.”16  The key players in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain 
include pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesale distributors, pharmacies, and Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers (“PBMs”).17  The complex chain from manufacturer to consumer in conjunction with 
heavy government regulation leads to a complicated market, which is difficult for most people to 
comprehend.18  
As long as there are patients with life-threatening illnesses, there is going to be a demand for 
prescription drugs.19  The market for pharmaceutical drugs is “highly inelastic” and regardless of 
how high drug prices rise, there will be a constant demand for life-saving drugs.20  Consequently, 
when a family member or loved one is diagnosed with a life threatening disease, often there is no 
time to waste and people are unlikely to sacrifice time shopping around for the best deal, nor are 
they likely to sacrifice quality for a lower price.21  Financial considerations take a back-seat and 
raw human emotions take control when individuals are tasked with making life or death decisions 
for their loved ones.22  Everything that economics textbooks tell us about the ordinary forces that 
drive product markets, like supply and demand23 suddenly become irrelevant and all that matters 
is keeping someone alive or improving their quality of life, no matter what the cost.24  The tough 
reality is that at the end of the day, despite being part of a market that represents an economic 
anomaly, pharmaceutical companies are businesses and as the centuries old decision in Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co. made clear: the foremost objective of a business is to generate profits for its 
shareholders.25  
Despite a unique market boasting near-inelastic demands, in the world of pharmaceuticals, 
nothing happens fast, and nothing comes cheap.  Developing a new drug can take ten to fifteen 
years.26  Estimates suggest “that only one out of every 5,000-10,000 drugs make it to” clinical 
trials,27 and only 11.83% of those drugs that make it to the clinical trial phase make it to the 
market.28  Odds like these seem better suited for a Las Vegas casino, maybe suggesting why 
 
16 Lisa Ellis, Snapshot of the American Pharmaceutical Industry, HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Jul. 14, 2016), 
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ecpe/snapshot-of-the-american-pharmaceutical-industry/. 
17 Id. 
18 See id. 
19 See Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 4 (explaining how “consumer demand in this market is expressed through the 
medium of a prescribing physician or other licensed health care provider”). 
20 Cami R. Schiel, Leveraging Pharma to Lower Premiums: Medical Loss Ratio Regulation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 2018 B.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 222 (2018). 
21 Id.  
22 See id. 
23 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 77 (8th ed. 2018) (explaining that the principles of market 
equilibrium suggest that when the price of a good increases past the equilibrium price, demand for the product will 
decrease); THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE ECONOMY 47 (5th ed. 2015) 
(“There is perhaps no more basic or more obvious principle of economics than the fact that people tend to buy more 
at a lower price and less at a higher price.”).  
24 See Schiel, supra note 20 (“In a way, it is a collective sense of humanity – an unwillingness to begrudge the funds 
needed in order to save a life or prolong suffering – that throws normal market forces out the window. The normal 
market is not designed for life-or-death situations. Drugs are.”). 
25 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (holding that “[a] business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders”). 
26 Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review of Proposals to Improve Access and Affordability of Prescription 
Drugs, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 311, 324 (2010). 
27 Id. 
28 See Joseph A. Dimasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 20, 25 (2016). 
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companies are willing to gamble their money with hopes of hitting a jackpot.  A recent study by 
Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development estimated the pre-approval cost of 
developing a new prescription drug at nearly $2.6 billion29 and that estimated post-approval 
research and development costs can increase that number by over $400 million.30  The level of risk 
involved in developing a new drug in conjunction with the astronomical costs of research and 
development justifies companies charging high prices in order to maintain profitable returns for 
their investors.31  
With low marginal costs after a drug is developed, why would pharmaceutical companies be 
incentivized to bear the costs necessary to develop a drug only for the rest of the market to produce 
it inexpensively and drive the price down?32  This is why patent33 and intellectual property laws34 
are critical to the pharmaceutical industry, as they provide the incentive for companies to invest in 
innovation by providing patent protection.35  In practical effect, patent protection grants the 
inventor or patent holder a “limited monopoly” for the duration of the patent and with that, 
deference to the judgement of manufacturers in pricing their drugs how they see fit.36  Because of 
patent law, regardless of whether or not the general public views the prices manufacturers charge 
as “morally repugnant,” they are legal.37  Another unfortunate consequence of the for-profit 
prescription drug industry is the lack of incentive for companies to invest in the development of 
drugs for less common “neglected conditions”38 with small patient populations, as they would not 
provide the high returns sought by drug manufacturers.  Despite both federal39 and state40 
initiatives to help make prescription drugs more affordable, many Americans are still underinsured 
and unable to afford the cost-sharing expenses41 imposed by their health plans.42 
 
29 See id.  
30 See id. at 26. 
31 See Schiel, supra note 20, at 239–42. 
32 See U.S. Pharmaceutical Pricing, supra note 9. 
33 U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2012). 
34 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Often referred to as “The Copyright Clause” this section of the U.S Constitution 
has been interpreted to authorize Congress’s power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
35 See Alexander Walsdorf, Note, I Get by with A Little Help from My 750-Dollar-Per-Tablet Friends: A Model Act 
for States to Prevent Dramatic Pharmaceutical Price Increases, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2497–98 (2018). 
36 Id. at 2498. 
37 Id. 
38 Schiel, supra note 20, at 241–42.  The term “neglected conditions” is used to describe conditions that are in need of 
cures or treatments but, because of the lack of a sizeable patient population due to the rarity of the condition, the 
subsequent demand is too low to justify the cost of developing treatment as it is unlikely that the product will be 
profitable. 
39 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 
2066 (2003).  See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §355 (1984)). 
40 See infra notes 147 and 151 and accompanying text. 
41 See Deductible, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/deductible/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2020). 
Insured patient’s out-of-pocket costs typically consist of deductibles, and either co-payments or co-insurance.  A 
deductible is the amount you pay for covered health care services before your insurance plan kicks in and starts to 
pay.  After you have reached your deductible, you typically pay either a co-pay or co-insurance for covered services 
and your insurance company provides the rest.  Co-payments are a fixed amount you pay for covered health care 
services after you have paid your deductible.  For example, a co-payment may be $20 per prescription.  Alternatively, 
co-insurance is based on a percentage of the costs of covered health care services after the deductible is met.  For 
example, a co-insurance payment may be 20% of total prescription cost.  
42 Tironi, supra note 26, at 311–12. 
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To understand the forces that drive prescription drug prices and the cost-sharing structure 
wherein PAPs fit, it is important to “demystify”43 the United States Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
and to have a general understanding of the different entities and the financial relationships that 
connect them.44  Pharmaceutical manufacturers invest in the research and development necessary 
to develop new drugs, produce important safety guidelines, and are the source of drugs in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain.45  Manufacturers typically distribute the drugs to wholesalers, 
specialty pharmacies, government purchasers and other bulk purchasers, rarely ever selling straight 
to customers.46  Aside from spending for research and development, drug manufacturers also spend 
significant amounts of money on direct-to-consumer advertising.47  Such significant spending on 
this consumer-targeted advertising is often purported to be “deceptive” because it allegedly takes 
advantage of patients who lack the requisite knowledge to know any better than to show up at their 
physician’s office and demand brand-name drugs based on testimonials from commercials.48  
Wholesale distributors purchase drugs in bulk from manufacturers, store them in warehouses 
and manage distributing them to a variety of customers such as pharmacies and hospitals.49  Over 
the years, the drug wholesale industry has consolidated considerably, leaving several companies 
in control of the market.50  To increase efficiency, the drug wholesale business has adapted to 
provide its customers with a variety of services in addition to traditional distribution such as 
handling electronic data, reimbursements and other specialized services.51  The final step in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain before drugs reach patients are pharmacies, which purchase drugs 
from wholesalers and store them until they are dispensed to patients when they fill a prescription.52  
Throughout this process, PBMs work alongside the other parties to negotiate manufacturer 
discounts on behalf of health plans (private insurance, employer health plans, government health 
plans, etc.) and decide which drugs will be included in the insurer’s formularies—the list of drugs 
they will cover.53  
Even more complex than the physical supply chain for prescription drugs is the financial flow 
between different parties.  Wholesalers purchase drugs from manufacturers at wholesale 
acquisition cost (“WAC”), which is often further discounted for things such as prompt-pay or high-
volume purchases.54  Pharmacies negotiate prices with manufacturers based on the pharmacy’s 
ability to sell certain volumes, and even though wholesalers distribute the drugs, the payment flows 
from the pharmacy to the manufacturer.55  If the negotiated price between the pharmacy and 
manufacturer is lower than the WAC price paid by wholesalers, the wholesaler will utilize a pricing 
mechanism known as a “chargeback” and the manufacturer will reimburse the wholesale 
distributor for the difference in the price paid by the consumer and the WAC price paid by 
 
43 Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 1.  
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 4.  
46 Id. 
47 See Ellis, supra note 16.  
48 But see Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 18. 
49 Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 8. 
50 See Matan C. Dabora et al., Financing and Distribution of Pharmaceuticals in the United States, 318 JAMA 21 
(2017) (“The US distributor market is highly consolidated, with 3 companies accounting for more than 85% of market 
share: AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and McKesson.”). 
51 Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 9. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1–2.  
54 Id. at 1. 
55 Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 19.  
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wholesalers.56  Somewhere in this complex chain is the PBM who contracts with health plans to 
manage drug costs by negotiating discounts and rebates with manufacturers in exchange for their 
drugs being included on the health plan’s formularies.57  
 At the end of the day, after each of these parties has had their say in the different negotiations, 
there is a price tag for the drug that needs to be paid before the consumer can ultimately access 
their drugs.  Health insurance plays a huge role in facilitating this process by utilizing cost-sharing 
methods to mitigate individual loss and “limit a consumer’s exposure to healthcare costs.”58  In 
order for the health insurance system to work, customers (patients) are responsible for their 
proportionate share of the cost in the form of co-pays, deductibles, etc.  With healthcare costs 
increasing every year,59 what happens when patients are unable to even afford their out-of-pocket 
expenses?  Enter: Patient Assistance Programs (“PAPs”). 
 
 
56 See id. 
57 Id. at 22.  
58 Schiel, supra note 20, at 223–24. 
59 Schiel, supra note 20, at 208.  
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Exhibit 1: Flow of Goods and Financial Transactions Among Players in the U.S. Commercial 
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain60  
 
II. Patient Assistance Programs 
 
 
60  Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 3.  
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PAPs have been considered an important “safety net” for low-income patients who do not 
have health insurance or are otherwise unable to afford their medication.61  PAPs can be structured 
in different ways such as direct manufacturer PAPs62 or Independent Charity PAPs.63  Direct PAPs 
are affiliated with pharmaceutical manufacturers and typically provide assistance in the form of 
free or discounted drugs as well as cash subsidies directly to the patients.64  PAPs that are offered 
directly through pharmaceutical manufacturers provide patients that meet the eligibility 
requirements with access to their brand name drugs at little or no out-of-pocket costs.65  
Indirect Patient Assistance is offered through Independent Charitable PAPs, 501(c)(3) non-
profit organizations such as Patient Advocacy or Patient Support Groups, that provide co-pay 
assistance to patients of a specific disease state.66  501 (c)(3) organizations receive federal tax-
exempt status, and in order to qualify the organization must be “organized and operated 
exclusively” for one of the purposes specified by the statute—which includes “charitable” 
purposes.67  “Independent charities operate PAPs that offer aid such as financial assistance to 
uninsured consumers or underinsured consumers who cannot meet their health plans’ premiums 
or cost sharing, such as co- payments, coinsurance, and deductibles.”68  Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers make cash donations to third party independent bona fide charities, which are 
charities that support patient groups that are in line with the manufacturer’s business and 
products.69  For example, a company that manufactures a drug for prostate cancer may donate to 
organizations with programs that support prostate cancer patients.  If properly structured, these 
programs use the donations they receive to award assistance to financially needy patients in a 
uniform and independent manner.  The goal is to increase patient’s access to drugs in a truly 
charitable manner that “severs any link between the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s funding and 
the beneficiary,”70 in other words, making sure that the assistance provided cannot be directly 
attributed to the manufacturers who made the donations.71  
 
 
61 See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 
70 Fed. Reg. 70,623–24 (Nov. 22, 2005). 
62 Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Patient Assistance Program Information, CTR.S FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/PAPData.html (last 
updated July 23, 2018).  The United States Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) describes 
Manufacturer Patient Assistance Programs as: “Pharmaceutical manufacturers may sponsor patient assistance 
programs (PAPs) that provide financial assistance or drug free product (through in-kind product donations) to low 
income individuals to augment any existing prescription drug coverage.”  Id. 
63 See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 
70 Fed. Reg. at 70,626. 
64 See id. at 70,624. 
65 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Patient Assistance Program Information, supra note 62. 
66  The primary eligibility requirement for most Patient Assistance Programs is financial need, which is usually based 
on some percentage of the federal poverty level.  See generally The Need for Patient Assistance and Access Programs, 
supra note 2. 
67 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).  
68 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44264, PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISCOUNT COUPONS AND PATIENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
15 (2017), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170615_R44264_1620b32a24a5e7e0bd6150be54c139fc134c4ab2.pdf 
(quoting from HHS OIG). 
69 See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 




III. Potential Corrupt Payments and the OIG  
 
In recent years, the United States has seen a sharp increase in pharmaceutical spending which 
has led the government to more closely scrutinize drug prices as well as the relationships between 
different actors in the pharmaceutical market.72  Under the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) 
pharmaceutical manufacturers cannot provide patients with any direct or indirect financial 
assistance that would subsidize their co-pays or expenses for drugs that are reimbursed by a 
government insurance program such as Medicare.73  Pursuant to the 2010 amendment to AKS,74 
violations of AKS that result in a federal health care payments are per se violations of the False 
Claims Act75 (“FCA”).76  The FCA has proven to be an effective tool for fighting healthcare-
related fraud by creating a public-private partnership by which “whistleblowers” can recover civil 
damages on behalf of the United States government.77  
The AKS prohibits manufacturers from offering or paying, directly or indirectly, any 
remuneration that would induce Medicare patients to purchase the company’s product.78  Co-pay 
requirements were included in Medicare programs partially to serve as a check on health care costs 
such as the prices that pharmaceutical manufacturers can demand for their drugs.79  The law is 
clear that waving co-pays can constitute a violation of the AKS and thus the FCA.80 
The Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) of the Department of Health and Human Services 
periodically develops and issues guidance to alert and inform the healthcare industry about 
potential issues as well as areas of special interest and legal significance.  Before the Medicare 
Part D program81 was even enacted, the OIG recognized the potential for fraud and published a 
Special Advisory Bulletin in 2005 assessing the potential for fraud and abuse if pharmaceutical 
manufacturers offered patient assistance to Medicare Part D beneficiaries.82  Although the OIG’s 
statements were based primarily on speculation at the time they were made, they highlight the fact 
that years ago, the OIG was already aware of the potential for fraud.83  In the 2005 Special 
Advisory Bulletin, the OIG clearly explained that pharmaceutical manufacturer affiliated PAPs 
that provided cost-sharing subsidies to Medicare Part D beneficiaries would implicate the anti-
kickback statute and “pose a heightened risk of fraud and abuse.”84  As a “less-abusive” alternative 
to direct manufacturer PAPs, the OIG made it clear that pharmaceutical manufacturers are still 
 
72 Follow the Pill, supra note 15, at 24. 
73 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2018).  
74 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g).  
75 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3733 (2018).  
76 See, e.g., Guilfoile v. Shields, 913 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2019). 
77 Andrew E. Brashier, The Federal Government's Chief Weapon in Combatting Fraud: The False Claims Act, 34 
ALA. ASS'N JUST. J. 60 (2014). 
78 Id.  
79 Press Release, DOJ, Drug Maker United Therapeutics Agrees to Pay $210 Million to Resolve False Claims Act 
Liability for Paying Kickbacks (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/drug-maker-united-therapeutics-
agrees-pay-210-million-resolve-false-claims-act-liability [hereinafter United Therapeutics Agrees to Pay $210 
Million].  
80 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g). 
81 See SCOTT BECKER ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE §7.02 (2d ed. 2012).  Medicare Part D is an 
outpatient prescription drug benefit program created to offer optional coverage to Medicare beneficiaries.  See id. 
82 See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 
70 Fed. Reg. at 70,624–25. 
83 See id.  
84 Id. at 70,624.  
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able to contribute to patient assistance through donations to independent charitable PAPs, as long 
as the programs were properly structured.85 
In defining what would be a “properly structured” program, the OIG provided five points 
of focus for which safeguards can be employed to minimize the risk of manufacturers using 
independent charity assistance programs as a vehicle to indirectly fund patients’ co-pays for their 
drugs.86  First, “neither the pharmaceutical manufacturer nor any affiliate of the manufacturer 
(including, without limitation, any employee, agent, officer, shareholder or contractor (including, 
without limitation, any wholesaler, distributor, or pharmacy benefits manager)) [should] exert[] 
any direct or indirect influence or control over the charity or the subsidy program.”87  Second, the 
charity should award “assistance in a truly independent manner that severs any link between the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s funding and the beneficiary (i.e., the assistance provided cannot be 
attributed to the donating pharmaceutical manufacturer).”88  Third, the charity should award 
“assistance without regard to the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s interests and without regard to 
the beneficiary’s choice of product, provider, practitioner, supplier, or Part D plan.”89  The OIG 
did, however, recognize that some independent patient assistance charities focus their programs 
on specific disease states in order to benefit patients suffering from that type of condition (i.e. 
prostate cancer or hemophilia) and have allowed donors to contribute to charities that support 
patients with diseases that the company manufactures drugs to treat.90  The OIG further noted that 
the fact that a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s donations are earmarked for a specific disease should 
not significantly raise the risk of abuse as long as the disease categories are not so narrowly defined 
to allow the donations to effectively subsidize the manufacturer’s product.91  Fourth, the charity 
should provide “assistance based upon a reasonable, verifiable, and uniform measure of financial 
need that is applied in a consistent manner.”92  Fifth, the pharmaceutical manufacturer should not 
“solicit or receive data from the charity that would facilitate the manufacturer in correlating the 
amount or frequency of its donations with the number of subsidized prescriptions for its 
products.”93  
In 2014, after years of being able to experience the implementation of Medicare Part D and 
the problematic features of PAPs, the OIG issued a Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin 
focused specifically on Independent Charity PAPs.94  The OIG stated that the 2014 Supplement 
was not meant to replace the 2005 Special Advisory Board but instead was intended to provide 
additional guidance regarding independent charity PAPs in light of new risks that had been 
identified in recent years.95  The 2014 Supplement expanded on the previous guidance in three 
 
85 Id.  
86 See id. at 70,626.  
87 Id. 
88 See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 
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specific areas: disease funds, eligible recipients, and donor conduct.96  The OIG called for 
increased scrutiny of charity-specific disease funds in an effort to ensure they are not defined so 
narrowly as to allow a donor to essentially subsidize their own products (i.e., specific stages of a 
disease, specific methods of treatment or rare diseases with only one available drug).97  The 
supplement noted that disease funds “should be defined in accordance with widely recognized 
clinical standards and in a manner that covers a broad spectrum of products,”98 and eligibility 
should be determined “according to a reasonable, verifiable, and uniform measure of financial 
need that is applied in a consistent manner.”99  The OIG used this supplement as an opportunity to 
clarify that PAPs may be limited to federal healthcare beneficiaries as long as the appropriate 
eligibility criteria is met.  The OIG emphasized that the cost of a particular drug, in isolation, is 
not an appropriate factor for determining financial need.  Generally, overly broad financial need 
criteria in conjunction with narrowly defined disease funds may be evidence of the intent to cover 
the co-pays of a specific drug instead of focusing on the goal of helping to fund treatment for 
financially struggling patients with a specific disease.  
 
IV. Recent Enforcement Actions 
 
The main concern for AKS implications lies in the potential for manufacturer donors to use 
the charity PAPs as a vehicle to essentially subsidize the cost of co-payments for their own 
products.100  Conduct on behalf of donors that attempts to correlate their contributions to the 
support for their products actually received by patients would raise a red flag of the intent to 
commit such fraud.101  In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), one of the agencies 
tasked with enforcing the AKS, has entered into numerous settlements with pharmaceutical 
companies in regard to anti-kickback violations due to alleged use independent patient assistance 
charities as “conduits” to pay for patient’s co-pays of their drugs.102  United Therapeutics 
Corporation (hereinafter “UT”) agreed to a $210 million settlement for allegedly using an 
independent patient assistance foundation to pay Medicare patient’s co-pays for their hypertension 
drug by not permitting Medicare beneficiaries from participating in UT’s direct free drug program 
and instead referring them to the foundation.103  Similarly, Jazz Pharmaceuticals (hereinafter 
“Jazz”), manufacturer of narcolepsy drug Xyrem, agreed to pay $57 million to settle allegations 
that they made Medicare patients ineligible for the company’s free drug program and instead 
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referred them to a narcolepsy-focused patient assistance foundation that almost exclusively 
supported Xyrem patients and was solely funded by Jazz.104  
UT and Jazz are just two examples of contributors to the over $800 million that has been 
paid by pharmaceutical companies in recent years in order to resolve FCA and AKS investigations 
related to patient assistance charities.105  Increased government scrutiny of the independent PAP 
structure has shown that the compliance risks involved in donating to these charities make it a 
high-risk activity for drug companies.106  The surge of federal government investigations along 
with nearly $1 billion in settlements suggests that something is not right with this system.  
 
V. Defining the Problem: How PAPs Affect Drug Spending and Who is Hurt 
 
 The pharmaceutical industry is unique in the sense that unlike many other markets, the 
end consumer (the patient) rarely pays anywhere near the actual cost of the product, instead that 
cost is shared with either private health insurance companies or federal healthcare programs.107  
Patients’ out-of-pocket expenses are typically a fraction of the drug’s total cost, and with the bulk 
of payment coming from insurance or other third party payers, patients become desensitized to 
drug prices because they do not pay the full price themselves.108  This structure essentially 
incentivizes drug suppliers to charge higher prices109 because insured patients are mainly 
concerned with their out-of-pocket costs and co-pays110 rather than the total cost of the drugs, 
which are paid by the insurance company or other third-party payor.  
Advocates of PAP-provided support make the argument that if patients are unable to afford 
medication to treat serious diseases, they will end up needing more expensive treatment in the 
future which, in the long run will increase the cost of the healthcare system as a whole.111  This 
may be true for the rare disease for which there is only one single viable treatment option, however, 
this argument is invalid when dealing with drugs that have generic equivalents.112  PAPs may 
“inhibit cost-effective medication use” and have important implications on public drug spending 
by allowing patients to use higher-cost medications when there are more cost-effective options 
available such as generics.113  
In order to illustrate, assume there is a branded drug that costs $10,000 and a generic 
equivalent of the same drug costs $1,000.  Patient “X” has health insurance that would make his 
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out-of-pocket cost for the branded drug $500, and his out-of-pocket cost for the generic version 
$5.  Patient X is unable to afford the branded drug but finds an independent PAP that covers most 
of his out-of-pocket costs for the branded drug.  With patient X’s out-of-pocket costs for the 
branded and generic drug now roughly the same, he decides to go with the branded drug.  Now, 
the insurance company is paying the remainder of the cost for the $10,000 branded drug, when 
there was a generic alternative available for one tenth of the cost.  
The Federal AKS114 exists in part to protect Medicare and the taxpayers who fund it from 
overpaying for drugs and essentially “‘holding the bag for the costs of expensive drugs.’”115  In 
response to recent DOJ settlements with pharmaceutical companies resolving allegations of anti-
kickback violations regarding independent foundations, District of Massachusetts U.S. Attorney 
Andrew E. Lelling explained, “This misconduct is widespread, and enforcement will continue until 
pharmaceutical companies stop circumventing the anti-kickback laws to artificially bolster high 
drug prices, all at the expense of the American taxpayers.”116  Consider Medicare beneficiaries 
who are unable to afford the out-of-pocket costs for expensive drugs.  Instead of pharmaceutical 
companies being pressured to lower drug prices, independent PAPs allow these individuals to 
purchase the expensive drugs at little to no out-of-pocket cost, and Medicare is left to pay the 
remainder of the drug price.117  By contributing money to independent charity PAPs in the disease 
areas of their products, manufacturers allow for federal healthcare beneficiaries to minimize their 
out-of-pocket costs and keep receiving the brand name drugs, ensuring the rest of the drug costs 
will be reimbursed by the government.  At the end of the day, American taxpayers are the ones 
being affected because millions of tax dollars are potentially wasted every year by overpaying for 
drugs that could be less expensive.118  When drug manufacturers support privately insured patients 
with direct patient assistance and co-pay coverage, private insurance companies are left to pick up 
the rest of the expensive drug costs.119  Therefore, privately-insured patients who would otherwise 
not even be able to afford their co-pays are able to get the drugs, and once again the drug 
manufacturers get paid.120  This creates further cost implications in the private insurance market 
because as more patients receive assistance to obtain high priced brand-named drugs when lower-
cost alternatives are available, gross expenses increase for the insurance companies.121  The most 
likely response from insurance companies is then to implement cost-sharing measures by raising 
the coverage rates for all patients, effectively passing on the increase in expenses they endure from 
covering higher-cost drugs when less expensive generic alternatives are available.122  PAPs can be 
critical for patients who need expensive life-saving drugs with no generic substitutes.123  When 
commercially insured patients utilize co-pay assistance in order to choose higher-cost branded 
drugs over available generics, the short-term out-of-pocket savings they enjoy may come at the 
cost of higher long-term expenses for themselves and society as a whole.124  Exhibit 2 below 
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illustrates that since the early 2000s, total annual healthcare spending in the U.S. has increased 
drastically, reflecting steady increases in both private health insurance as well as Medicare 
spending.  Meanwhile, out-of-pocket costs paid by individuals remain stagnant, failing to increase 
proportionately with the increases in spending.  
Exhibit 2: Annual U.S. Health Care Spending 1970-2017125 
One of the most puzzling aspects of the PAP “system” as a whole is that despite the 
argument that they help manufacturers keep drug prices high, multiple parties in this field benefit 
from the current system and there is thus little motivation to advocate for change.  PAPs act as 
effective public relations programs for pharmaceutical companies because when patients complain 
about high drug prices, manufacturers can respond by claiming they will help out anyone who 
cannot afford the drugs or point them in the direction of a charity PAP.126  Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have no reason to advocate for change because supporting PAPs gives the 
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appearance that they are helping make drugs more affordable to patients, but in reality, they are 
making sure that they get paid.127  
For example, Mechanic Andre Rucker was diagnosed with a rare blood cancer and 
struggled to afford his $500 per month co-pay for the treatment with an annual cost of $142,000, 
explaining “it was a choice between covering his mortgage and paying for his cancer drug.”128  
Rucker received co-pay assistance from the Patient Access Network Foundation, an independent 
PAP funded largely by drug manufacturers that has previously been investigated by the 
Department of Justice for alleged fraud.129  When discussing the criticism of PAPs, like the one 
that allowed him afford his cancer medication, Rucker admitted that he has a hard time questioning 
the program that helped save his life and explained that “I know it’s drug [company]-funded . . . 
[B]ut without that, I wouldn’t be sitting here talking to you right now.”130  This simple yet powerful 
statement accurately illustrates the issue that despite their knowledge of the highly-criticized 
relationship between drug manufacturers and PAPs, patients who accessed life-saving medication 
because of these organizations are highly unlikely to turn around and accuse them of any 
wrongdoing, let alone advocate for change to a system that has only benefitted them.131  The 
challenge lies in finding a way to make people understand that making drugs more affordable for 
a certain group of individuals does nothing to address the bigger issues of high drug prices and 
increased healthcare costs.132 
Recently, the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) published a study that 
analyzed the characteristics of independent PAPs.  The study focused on six of the largest patient 
charity organizations in the United States and the sub-group of 274 PAPs they maintained, 
analyzing their contributions for the fiscal year 2018.133 
Based on the analysis of this sub-group, drugs were covered by at least one PAP for 36% of 
generic drugs “costing less than $7,200, 52% of drugs costing between $7,200 and $10,000, 73% 
of specialty drugs costing between $10,000 and $30,000, and 83% of specialty drugs costing more 
than $30,000.”134  PAPs were more likely to cover higher-priced specialty drugs and brand-name 
drugs than less-expensive brand-name drugs and generic equivalents.135  “The exclusion of 
uninsured patients from the eligibility criteria was a uniform pattern across PAPs.”136  For PAPs, 
the cost of providing support to an insured patient is cheaper than covering an uninsured patient 
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out-of-pocket expenses and will have the rest of the drug cost covered by Medicare or private 
insurance.137  The most likely justification for excluding uninsured patients, is that this allows 
programs to use their limited amount of funding to help the largest number of patients.138  A 
primary focus of the OIG’s 2014 Supplementary Advisory Bulletin was to reiterate that the donor 
should not be able to access any information that would enable them to “correlate the amount or 
frequency of its donations with the number of aid recipients who use its products or services or the 
volume of those products supported by the PAP.”139  A PAP’s eligibility requirement that patients 
have some form of health insurance does not directly give donors any information regarding 
assistance provided for their specific product, however, the statistics published by PAPs in their 
annual reports disclose exactly what percentage of funds are used to cover patient co-pays.140  
For PAPs that give out almost 100% of their funds in the form of co-pay assistance, this 
indirectly lets manufacturers know that nearly all of the PAP’s contributions will be used to pay 
co-pays for patients whose drug costs will be covered by insurance, and also provides data that, 
depending on the specific PAP, could be utilized to make rough estimates of which products 
patients receive assistance.141  The findings that show a higher percentage of PAP coverage of 
specialty or brand-name drugs as opposed to generics, supports the argument that PAPs encourage 
physicians and patients to choose specialty or brand-name treatments.142  Even though these 
treatment options are likely to be much more expensive in total cost, despite the availability of 
lower cost generics, the higher likelihood of available co-pay assistance from PAPs means that the 
specialty and brand-name drugs may have the lowest out-of-pocket costs for patients.143  
In an editorial accompanying the JAMA study, Katherine Kraschel, JD, of Yale Law School, 
and Gregory Curfman, MD, of JAMA, claimed that the findings questioned the role of PAPs as 
charitable organizations and further noted that: 
 
By preferring patients with insurance (which must cover the patient’s specific 
drug), the nonprofit [PAPs] maximize payments to the for-profit pharmaceutical 
companies that fund them. The findings also illustrate the way PAPs drive up health 
care costs by providing support for more expensive specialty drugs in lieu of less 
expensive alternatives. In sum, these new results show that PAPs provide assistance 
to a narrow, insured patient population to the benefit of the pharmaceutical 
companies.144 
 
This analysis highlights that the relationship between PAPs and pharmaceutical manufacturers 
may not be as straightforward and altruistic as it appears.  The complexity of this relationship can 
potentially allow a seemingly charitable arrangement to advance the underlying financial motives 
of the pharmaceutical companies that fund them. 
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VI. Recent State Legislation Attempts and Why They Fell Short 
 
Although no federal regulation expressly prohibits direct manufacture patient assistance to 
federal health care beneficiaries, the OIG guidance made it clear that such support would be subject 
to strict scrutiny, leading manufacturers to exclude Medicare beneficiaries from their assistance 
programs.145  Despite shying away from supporting federal healthcare beneficiaries, manufacturers 
continue to offer co-pay assistance to privately insured patients.146  In efforts to lower drug costs 
by promoting the use of generics, California enacted legislation in 2018 which prohibits 
manufacturers of brand name drugs from providing co-pay assistance to patients for drugs that fall 
into one of two categories.147  The first category is drugs for which a lower cost generic drug that 
has been designated as a therapeutic equivalent by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is 
available and is covered under the patient’s health insurance plan.148  The second category is drugs 
that have active ingredients that are contained in products that are approved by the FDA and 
available without prescription at a lower cost and are not otherwise contraindicated for the 
treatment of the condition for which the prescription drug is approved.149  Yet, the California law 
“does not prohibit or limit assistance to a patient provided by an independent charity PAP.”150  
Similarly, Massachusetts anti-kickback law includes provisions that limit drug 
manufacturer co-pay assistance stating, “[p]harmaceutical manufacturing companies shall be 
prohibited from offering any discount, rebate, product voucher or other reduction in an individual’s 
out-of-pocket expenses, including co-payments and deductibles, for any prescription drug that has 
an AB rated generic equivalent as determined by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration.”151  Unlike the California Law, the Massachusetts statute applies not only to drugs 
paid for by government healthcare programs but extends to drugs paid for by any insurer which 
includes private health insurance.152  The Massachusetts statute only applies to direct patient 
assistance and does not extend to restrict the provision of co-pay assistance through independent 
PAPs.153  
Neither of these laws include any restrictions on contributions to independent patient assistance 
foundations.154  Manufacturers already stay away from providing direct patient assistance to 
Medicare beneficiaries for fear of anti-kickback violations and creating laws to limit direct patient 
assistance to privately insured patients is unlikely to fix this problem.155  With statutes like these 
in effect, rather than cut off all patient assistance spending, it is more likely that manufacturers 
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will instead redirect their financial assistance in the form of support to charitable patient assistance 
foundations that are consistent with federal and state requirements.156  
 
VII. Possible Federal Legislative Approaches   
 
One of the challenges with using state legislation to tackle rising drug prices is that different 
laws must be enacted over time by each individual state.  Not only could this be time consuming 
given that any proposed laws would have to pass through each state’s legislative process, but it 
could potentially present issues in consistency, as each state’s laws would likely be different.  
Perhaps most pertinent is the fact that any change in drug prices due to state legislation would lack 
the immediate and large-scale effects that would come with federal legislation.  Although greater 
in scope, designing federal legislation to lower drug prices presents its own challenges.  
For example, in 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi introduced the “Lower Drug Costs Now 
Act,” a proposed federal approach to lowering drug prices that was met with fierce opposition by 
drug manufacturers and industry experts.157  Among other things, the Act would force drug 
manufacturers who raised prices in excess of “inflation since 2016 to either reverse the price or 
rebate the amount of the increase to the federal government.”158  Manufacturers of the limited 
group of drugs chosen for the program would essentially be forced to accept a “maximum fair 
price” determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or be subjected to up to a 95% 
sales tax.159  The act does not expressly make reference to PAPs, but it does explain that the 
maximum fair price would be the exact price patients pay at the pharmacy, making it unlikely that 
any further discounts would be allowed for those drugs.160  Although a federal legislative approach 
to drug pricing might be a step in the right direction, the fact that this proposed law would apply 
only to a select group of drugs fails to provide consistency, as the benefits are limited to those 
patients who need the drugs chosen to be included in the program.  As highlighted earlier, making 
specific drugs more affordable for specific groups of people is merely a crutch and fails to address 
the bigger issue why the drug prices are as high as they are.161  With regard to the drugs not 
included in the proposed law, patients, health insurers and the government are left to deal with the 
patient assistance problem.  
The issue that is drawing the most opposition and will likely cause this bill to fail illustrates 
perhaps the greatest challenge in designing a federal law to lower drug prices: maintaining balance 
between lowering prices and still encouraging medical innovation.162  By putting manufacturers in 
a gun-to-the-head situation to either accept the governments price or pay unrealistic tax penalties, 
a rigid structure like this is likely to decrease research and development spending and result in less 
life-saving drugs from reaching the market.163  In fact, the Council of Economic Advisors estimates 
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that if passed, the Lower Drug Costs Now Act could lead to as many as one hundred fewer drugs 
entering the U.S. market over the next decade and a decrease in national life expectancy.164  
Perhaps a better solution would be a federal law that makes it illegal for any drug manufacturer 
PAP or independent charity PAP to provide co-pay assistance towards drugs for which there is an 
FDA approved generic equivalent.  If the prices for these drugs remained so economically 
discriminatory to the extent that patients are unable to afford the co-pays for the drug without 
assistance, it is likely that more generics would be utilized and the healthcare system as a whole 
would see a decrease in spending.  What becomes of the manufacturers and their high drug prices? 
With patients having to choose medication based on more realistic financial considerations, lower-
cost alternatives will hopefully begin to push the overpriced branded drugs out of the market.  
Ideally this would allow normal economic factors165 to come into play and force the prices to lower 
naturally over time, as opposed to a drastic and artificial decrease like what was proposed in the 




The drug pricing crisis in the United States is real; health care costs are continuing to rise and 
show no sign of slowing down anytime soon.167  As this paper hopefully reflected, there are a great 
deal of moving parts in the U.S. prescription drug market and the economics behind drug prices 
are truly enigmatic.  If nothing is done to fix this crisis, drug prices and healthcare spending will 
continue to keep rising until what . . . ?  For now, that ending remains unknown.  One thing, 
however, we can know for sure—there is a patient assistance problem.  
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